I investigate whether broad access to fundamental information allows retail municipal bond investors to transact at prices similar to those at which institutional investors transact. I capitalize on the introduction of an online financial disclosure repository that simultaneously lowered the cost for retail investors to access fundamental information and lowered the cost for issuers to disseminate it. I find a reduction in the premium small investors pay above large investors for bonds whose issuers were compliant with their disclosure obligations in the online repository. These findings suggest that as investors' information sets align, so does their bargaining power with dealers. * Stern School of Business, New York University. I am grateful to Peter Schmitt of DPC Data for providing data and information about the structure of the municipal market. A preliminary draft of this paper benefited greatly from comments from Ray Ball,
Introduction
Despite its size and importance, the municipal bond market remains opaque relative to other financial markets. Municipal bond trading is decentralized, pre-trade price quotations are provided only upon request, and real time post-trade price transparency was not available until 2005. The high cost of gathering pricerelevant information confers bargaining power upon institutional investors and disadvantages retail investors (Green et al., 2007b) . This informational disadvantage partly explains why small investors pay more than large investors for the same bond.
Prior research documents that public dissemination of post-trade price data lowers the premium small investors pay relative to large investors.
1 Whereas large institutional investors have substantial knowledge of bond values irrespective of public transaction reporting, small retail investors negotiate better terms of trade when they are privy to the prices paid by other investors. However, the municipal bond market is deeply illiquid and information is costly. Therefore, prices do not fully reflect all available information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) .
In this paper, I consider the possibility that the cost of gathering fundamental information contributes to institutional investors' disproportionate bargaining power relative to retail investors. Institutional investors continually search for relevant economic and fundamental information about the bonds they hold in inventory because they are required to price their municipal bond positions daily. However, search costs for fundamental information are high because post-issuance financial disclosure is limited in the municipal market. Many issuers do not publicly disseminate financial statements or budgets and, prior to 2009, these documents were filed with designated fee-based information repositories.
I capitalize on the introduction of a free, electronic, centralized repository for municipal disclosures (similar to the SEC's EDGAR system for corporate disclosures). The filing repository had two distinct, but related outcomes. First, it allowed retail investors to access information previously only available to large institutions. Provided that municipal budgets and financial statements are informative to investors, low cost access to these filings allows the information sets of retail and institutional investors to converge. Second, the online repository lowered the cost for issuers to broadly disseminate information, thereby increasing disclosure. In the absence of disclosure, dealers and institutions maintain an advantage over retail investors because they have historical knowledge of the issuer and the expertise to benchmark against similar bonds.
When issuer-specific information is made available to all market participants (dealers, institutions, and individuals), the value of this market expertise declines and information sets are again aligned. Because both outcomes of the repository reduce information asymmetry, they may align the bargaining power of retail and institutional investors and enable retail investors to transact with dealers at prices closer to those at which institutional investors transact.
I draw identification from bond-level changes in transaction costs on retail-sized trades relative to transaction costs on institutional-sized trades around the introduction of the online repository. This design uses large traders, who had relatively low-cost access to available financial disclosures and market knowledge in the absence of financial disclosure, as a control group. I draw further identification from variation in ex-ante compliance with continuing disclosure obligations. Of the bonds whose issuers were compliant with their disclosure obligations ex-ante, only those bonds whose issuers remain compliant in the online repository are affected by dissemination. Similarly, of the bonds whose issuers were non-compliant with their disclosure obligations ex-ante, only bonds whose issuers subsequently became compliant in the online repository are affected by improved disclosure.
I provide evidence that both low-cost dissemination and improved disclosure help to reduce the premium small bond buyers pay above large bond buyers. However, I find that neither dissemination nor improved disclosure play a role in small investors' ability to price bonds they sell. The disparity between retail purchases and retail sales suggests bond sellers draw bargaining power with dealers from sources other than fundamental information and are less likely to use this information to perform due diligence than bond buyers.
After controlling for interest rates, credit risk premia, local economic condition, bond age, time to maturity, trade volume, time in dealer inventory, transaction size-specific time trends, and time-invariant bond characteristics, the premium small investors pay for bonds whose issuers were continuously compliant with their disclosure obligations fell 12.8 basis points after their disclosures were broadly disseminated. This reduction represents an economically significant 30 percent convergence of small trade and large trade transaction costs relative to pre-dissemination levels.
While this evidence is consistent with the notion that access to disclosure helps to reduce the small trade premium, the introduction of the repository is coincident with the end of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
Therefore, I explore cross-sectional variation in the reduced small trade premium to gain assurance that these results are attributable to dissemination. I find that the reduction is only evident for bonds whose issuers have few alternate channels through which information can be disseminated and bonds whose issuers' first disclosure in the repository was filed within six months of period end. Moreover, the small trade premium marginally increased for the falsification sample of bonds whose issuers were compliant with their disclosure obligations ex-ante but subsequently became non-compliant in the online repository.
The premium small investors pay to purchase bonds whose issuers became newly compliant with their disclosure obligations in the online repository fell 20.8 basis points, or 44 percent. This reduction is par-ticularly pronounced for newly compliant issuers of revenue bonds, whose financial statements are useful given the specificity of the repayment source. The reduction is also pronounced for bonds whose issuers' first disclosure in the repository was filed within six months of period end. Providing further support for the notion that these results are attributable to improved disclosure compliance, the small trade premium did not change for the falsification sample of bonds whose issuers were non-compliant ex-ante and remain non-compliant in the online repository.
This paper makes several key contributions. The study is one of the first to document a relationship between post-issuance disclosure compliance and transaction costs in the secondary market for municipal bonds. Tightly regulated corporate disclosures reduce information asymmetry among equity investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) , thereby reducing the expected cost of adverse selection and the bid-ask spread.
However, municipal disclosure is notoriously limited, lacks timeliness, and lacks comparability across issuers.
Therefore, it is not obvious that post-issuance municipal disclosure is useful to investors. Despite these limitations, I find that timelier access to municipal disclosure is associated with a convergence of retail and institutional prices. These results imply that either the limited information contained in municipal financial filings is useful to investors or bond dealers perceive that it is.
This study is also novel in that the results support the notion that institutional investors draw some of their bargaining power with dealers from access to fundamental information. In conjunction with post-trade transaction reporting (Schultz, 2012) , reduced cost access to fundamental information helped to reduce the premium retail investors pay to purchase municipal bonds, suggesting an alignment of retail and institutional bargaining power. Finally, the paper operationalizes the well-documented small trade premium (Harris and Piwowar, 2006) as a proxy for asymmetric bargaining power among municipal bond investors (Green et al., 2007b) . In addition to the theoretical appeal of measuring changes in retail transaction costs relative to institutional changes, this approach is a crucial design choice that helps to control for general movements in transaction costs.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents hypotheses and describes municipal disclosure practices. Section 3 describes the data used in the study. Section 4 provides evidence of the relationship between disclosure and small trade premiums, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Transparency in the municipal bond market 2.1 Market structure and post-trade price transparency
In most equity markets, competitive market makers match buy and sell orders that arrive over time from anonymous traders (Easley and O'Hara, 1987) . Pre-trade price quotations are continuously available and lasttrade prices are easily accessible to all investors. The market maker sells securities at a premium over "true" value and buys securities at a discount. This "bid-ask spread" serves as compensation for (1) order-processing costs (Roll, 1984) , (2) inventory risk (Ho and Stoll, 1981) , and (3) the cost of adverse selection incurred when transacting with better-informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . The probability a trader is informed generally increases in trade size, causing quoted spreads to increase in size. Prior literature supports the role of accounting in reducing information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) , thereby reducing the adverse selection component of spreads in equity markets.
By contrast, transparency is far more elusive the secondary market for municipal bonds. Pre-trade price transparency is non-existent and last-trade reporting is a recent innovation. Thus, municipal bond dealers are better informed about order flow than the customers with whom they transact. This knowledge confers an informational advantage upon dealers and reduces the expected cost of adverse selection. The spread (or "markup" over the true value of the security) serves as compensation for the aforementioned costs of intermediation (order processing, inventory risk, and adverse selection) as well as an additional markup due to dealer market power (Duffie et al., 2005; Green et al., 2007b) .
The ability of dealers to extract rents is greater in retail transactions because individual investors lack the sophistication and resources of institutional investors to search for and accurately assess the fairness of price quotes.
2 Professional traders are in constant communication with their counterparts at other dealer firms, their own institutional sales people, and the underwriting desk gathering information and soliciting views.
By contrast, individual investors have limited incentive to develop such expertise. This lack of sophistication partly explains why transaction costs in the municipal (and, to a lesser extent, corporate) bond markets decrease in trade size (Green et al., 2007a; Harris and Piwowar, 2006) . 3 Transaction costs that decrease in trade size are particularly relevant in the municipal bond market because households account for 51 percent of municipal bond holdings. 4 Moreover, retail-sized transactions are more common than institutional-sized 2 Municipal bond dealers are required to register with the MSRB and are subject to a variety of best practice, due diligence, and disclosure obligations. The National Association of Securities Dealers' Rules of Fair Practice (Article III, section IV) prohibits "excessive" markups (defined as sale price less purchase price) of more than 5 percent.
3 Other explanations for transaction costs that decrease in trade size are fixed intermediation costs and regulatory capital charges incurred on holding odd lots. However, fixed intermediation costs are unlikely to vary with disclosure and regulatory capital concerns increased (rather than decreased) throughout the sample period, working against my hypotheses.
4 Followed by mutual funds at 24 percent and insurance companies at 13 percent. Data as of September 2011.
The Federal Reserve Flow of Accounts statistical release is available at the following address: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf. transactions in the secondary market for municipal bonds.
Public dissemination of executed transaction prices (post-trade transparency) is a means of revealing information about price and leveling the playing field between customers and dealers. Several studies show that post-trade transparency reduces the informational advantage of dealers and lowers transaction costs for corporate bond investors (Edwards et al., 2007; Goldstein et al., 2006; Bessembinder et al., 2006) . Similarly, real-time trade reporting in the municipal bond market was mandated in 2005 and played a role in reducing the 42 bp premium small investors pay over large investors on the offer date by 40 percent (Schultz, 2012) .
Disclosure and issuer transparency
I complement the aforementioned price transparency studies by considering a related form of transparency: the availability of fundamental information. Issuers of municipal securities are exempt from the majority of federal securities laws, including the registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. Disclosure at the time of issuance (in the form of offering documents called "official statements") is robust because the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) requires underwriters to obtain such documents to offer the securities to investors. In these offering documents, issuers must agree to provide annual financial disclosures to designated information repositories within a specified period (usually six to nine months). However, breach of a continuing disclosure covenant does not constitute a technical default and issuers are not subject to direct regulatory enforcement of their disclosure obligations. The lack of regulatory consequences for failure to file post-issuance financial statements makes disclosure effectively voluntary for many issuers.
Prior research estimates that 40 percent of issuers in a given year fail to provide post-issuance disclosures (Schmitt, 2011) . Because officials have a fiduciary relationship with investors and a political relationship with the electorate, disclosure decisions are the outcome of a trade-off between the capital market benefits and the political costs of disclosure (Cuny, 2016) . From a capital market standpoint, disclosure quality is positively related to debt levels and negatively related to alternate mechanisms to reduce the cost of capital, such as bond insurance . From a political standpoint, disclosure quality is negatively related to electoral incentives (Kido et al., 2012) and positively related to governance mechanisms that constrain these incentives (Evans and Patton, 1983; Austin and Robbins, 1986; Gore, 2004; Baber et al., 2013) .
In the absence of financial statements, investors benchmark against fiscal, economic, and demographic information for similar issuers. Benchmarking requires industry expertise and access to relevant data. Thus, dealers and institutional investors are better positioned to value bonds in the absence of disclosure than retail investors. Even when financial statements are publicly available, they may be prohibitively costly to access. Financial statements and budgets were historically only accessible through fee-based information repositories.
5 Therefore, dealers and large institutional investors had access to available disclosures that were likely not accessible to retail investors. Illustrating the informational disadvantage of retail investors, nearly 700 dealer-to-customer sales in 2008 were executed above par after a distress or default notice was filed (Schmitt, 2009) . Trades in principal amounts of less than $100,000 accounted for 65 percent of these transactions.
Recognizing the relative disadvantage retail investors experience in obtaining fundamental information, the MSRB established an online continuing disclosure service via the Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) system in 2009. The stated objective of the web site was to provide information "free of charge... presented in a manner specifically tailored for retail, non-professional investors who may not be experts in financial or investing matters." EMMA now serves as the sole official repository for issuers' continuing disclosure documents, which are available to the public at no charge. Moreover, part of the Dodd Frank Act requires municipal bond dealers to ensure investors are aware of the information filed in EMMA.
6
In addition to reducing the cost for investors to access fundamental information, the EMMA system reduced the cost for issuers to disseminate information. Prior research demonstrates that issuers, particularly those with few alternate dissemination channels, responded to the reduced dissemination cost with increased disclosure (Cuny, 2016) . To the extent financial disclosures are useful to investors, the existence of information (Healy et al., 1999; Lang et al., 2012) and access to it (Bushee et al., 2003) should reduce information asymmetry between institutional and retail investors. As their information sets align, so does their bargaining power with dealers, narrowing the gap between per-bond retail-sized trade prices and institutional-sized trade prices. The bonds for which disclosure was provided to DPC Data in each year that it was required are termed
CompliantBefore bonds. By contrast, the remaining bonds are termed NonCompliantBefore bonds. DPC Data estimates that 50 percent of bonds are characterized by at least one year of delinquent disclosure (Schmitt, 2008) . However, obtain from EMMA the dates of financial filings indexed to each bond in the sample. As described in Table   1 , half of the bonds in the sample had at least one financial filing in EMMA within the first six months (by January 2010). Eighty-eight percent of sample bonds had at least one filing by the time the EMMA system had been in place for a full year (July 2010), and 7 percent of sample bonds had no disclosures filed by the end of the sample period in 2011. The average time lag between period end and the filing date of the first filing in EMMA for sample bonds was 222 days. 8 This average is consistent with the typical reporting deadlines for municipalities of 6 to 9 months.
Irrespective of fiscal year-ends or contractual reporting timelines, all sample issuers must file at least one operating filing in EMMA each year to be compliant with their annual disclosure obligations. Therefore, the 85 percent of sample bonds for which a filing was provided in EMMA in each of the first two years of its existence are termed CompliantAfter bonds.
When estimating the relationship between dissemination and transaction costs, I focus on bonds whose disclosures were available but costly to access before 2009 and available cheaply after 2009. Seventy-two percent of sample bonds' issuers were compliant with disclosure obligations in DPC Data before 2007 and were also compliant in EMMA after 2009. I label these bonds AlwaysCompliant. By contrast, retail investors do not gain access to disclosures filed by issuers that were compliant in DPC Data but do not subsequently disseminate information in EMMA (NewlyNonCompliant). 9 Therefore, changes in the premium small investors pay for these bonds are not attributable to dissemination. NewlyNonCompliant bonds account for 7 Both DPC Data and EMMA aggregate disclosure information at the issue level (rather than the issuer level) because disclosure requirements vary at the issue level.
8 The sample of time lags is smaller than the full sample of bonds that filed disclosures in EMMA because EMMA does not always clearly define the period-end date in the title of the filing.
9 Pre-refunding may explain an issuer becoming non-compliant after 2009. There are 199 bonds in the sample that were pre-refunded before the end of the sample period. Despite the fact that disclosure is no longer required after pre-refunding, 53 percent of these bonds are AlwaysCompliant, 28 percent are NewlyNonCompliant, 10 percent are NewlyCompliant, and 9 percent are NeverCompliant. The results described in the remainder of the paper are robust to excluding these bonds from the analysis.
11 percent of the sample. Table 2 , Panel A documents the fundamental ways in which AlwaysCompliant bonds differ from NewlyNonCompliant bonds. Despite the fact that both groups of bonds are similar in terms of their ex-ante disclosure compliance, they differ along several dimensions. On average, AlwaysCompliant bonds are half a year younger, have a year less remaining to maturity, are 1.6 notches higher rated, less likely to be callable or pre-refunded, less likely to be revenue bonds, and are more likely to be issued by large general purpose issuers with more total debt outstanding (Zimmerman, 1977) than their NewlyNonCompliant counterparts.
When estimating the relationship between improved disclosure compliance and transaction costs, I focus on bonds whose issuers were NonCompliantBefore but became CompliantAfter, termed NewlyCompliant bonds. Because information about these bonds was unavailable (or inconsistent) in the pre-EMMA period, all investors in these bonds receive new information in the post-EMMA period. NewlyCompliant bonds account for 13 percent of the sample. By contrast, neither dealers nor investors receive new information about bonds whose issuers are ex-ante non-compliant and remain non-compliant in EMMA (NeverCompliant).
NeverCompliant bonds account for 4 percent of the sample.
Panel A of Table 2 documents the fundamental ways in which NewlyCompliant bonds differ from NeverCompliant bonds. Again, despite their similarity in terms of ex-ante disclosure non-compliance, these bonds differ along several dimensions. On average, NewlyCompliant bonds are half a year younger, have 5 years less remaining to maturity, are 2 notches higher rated, more likely to be insured, less likely to be callable or pre-refunded, and are issued by issuers with more total debt outstanding than their NeverCompliant counterparts.
Transaction costs
I obtain MSRB trade data from January 2007 through December 2011. This timeframe is chosen for several reasons. First, I measure an issuer's choice of disclosure compliance ex-ante so that I can distinguish between changes in transaction costs after 2009 that are attributable to disclosure and those that are unrelated.
Second, the sample periods before and after the repository is implemented are equal to facilitate a differencein-difference analysis. Third, the sample period avoids the confounding effects of real-time trade price dissemination, which took effect in January 2005, and the addition of credit ratings to EMMA, which took effect in November 2011. Moreover, the time horizon is consistent with the four-year window over which Schultz (2012) measures the effect of real-time transaction reporting.
Transaction-level data provided by the MSRB include a per-bond price (expressed as a percentage of the principal amount of the security), the principal amount of the bond traded, a date and time stamp, and an indicator of whether the trade was a dealer sale to a customer, a dealer purchase from a customer, or an inter-dealer trade. The MSRB data do not reveal the identity of the dealer reporting the transaction nor do they distinguish retail customers from institutional customers. Therefore, I use market convention to distinguish between these two types of investors. Trades of $100,000 in principal value, known as "blocks,"
are more likely to be executed by institutional customers (e.g., mutual funds and insurance companies).
Smaller trades, known as "odd lots," are more likely to be executed by retail customers (Edwards et al., 2007; Schultz, 2001) . The $100,000 retail trade cutoff is further substantiated by the fact that institutional investors in the municipal bond market have few incentives to break up trades into smaller pieces because trading is not anonymous and transaction costs decrease in trade size.
To increase the likelihood that transaction size distinguishes between retail trades and institutional trades, I follow Schultz (2012) and further partition the retail trade category into those less than $25,000 ("small retail") and those greater than or equal to $25,000 ("large retail"). I also partition the institutional trade category into those less than $250,000 ("small institutional") and those greater than or equal to $250,000
("large institutional"). For the purposes of comparing markups on retail trades and markups on institutional trades, I focus on the difference between markups on trades less than $25,000 and markups on trades greater than or equal to $250,000.
Measuring markups on bond purchases and markdowns on bond sales
Transaction-level data facilitate relatively direct measurement of the difference between a security's "true" value and its selling price. I assume dealers transact with one another at a fair price. For each day in which at least one inter-dealer trade and at least one customer trade occurs, I take the average price at which dealers transact with one another and measure the markup (or markdown) as the basis point difference between this benchmark and the price at which customers purchase (or sell) the same security on the same day.
Admittedly, the directness of this measurement method comes at the cost of imposing a liquidity constraint on the data. Similar to the transaction cost methodology used in Schultz (2012) , I measure markup (markdown) on any customer transaction on date t in bond b as:
T rade Sign b,t is a buy/sell indicator equal to "1" if the trade is a customer purchase, "-1" if the trade is a customer sale, and "0" if the trade is inter-dealer. Negative markups (and markdowns), which are uncommon and akin to a negative bid-ask spread, are discarded (Chordia et al., 2001) . I also Winsorize trade markups (and markdowns) at the 1% (99%) level to reduce the effect of outliers and data entry errors.
I segregate markups on purchases from markdowns on sales for three reasons. First, markups on customer purchases tend to be larger than markdowns on customer sales (Green et al., 2010) . Moreover, the negotiating process is different. Potential bond buyers are generally approached by a single dealer, however they can choose among many assets that the dealer holds in inventory. By contrast, customers selling bonds can approach multiple dealers to ensure best execution, however they are constrained by the specificity of the asset they own, are limited to their network of dealers, and are likely facing a liquidity shock that prioritizes speed over price. Second, a dealer holding a bond in inventory is more likely to have an informational advantage that stems from familiarity with fundamentals than when a customer approaches a dealer. Third, because the magnitude of the markup on purchases and the markdown on sales is different, it is important to avoid confounding the results with variation in the proportion of buys and sells rather than variation in information asymmetry.
To ensure sample composition is constant in the difference-in-difference tests, I constrain the data such that markups (markdowns) on trades of varying sizes can be measured in the pre-EMMA period and the post-EMMA period. To be included in the sample of markups on bond purchases, I require that each bond has at least one customer purchase with a contemporaneous inter-dealer trade match in each of the four trade size categories (small retail, large retail, small institutional, and large institutional) in the 2.5 years preceding EMMA's implementation and in the 2.5 years following EMMA's implementation. Thus, each bond in the sample of markups has a minimum of eight dealer-matched customer purchases across the fiveyear sample period. The markup sample contains 538,444 bond purchases across 3,139 bonds issued by 990 issuers. Customer purchases are more common than customer sales (Green et al., 2010) , however I follow the same procedure for markdowns, resulting in a sample of 177,772 bond sales across 1,841 bonds issued by 684 issuers. Table 2 , Panel B documents the trading characteristics of bond purchases across the four disclosure compliance categories. Though AlwaysCompliant and NewlyNonCompliant bonds are similar in terms of their ex-ante disclosure compliance, they are traded differently. The average AlwaysCompliant purchase is nearly half as large as the average NewlyNonCompliant purchase, suggesting more institutional trading in the latter. Moreover, investors pay 42 bps more for AlwaysCompliant bonds than NewlyNonCompliant bonds. This is potentially due to the greater level of dealer intermediation and higher contemporaneous trade volume associated with AlwaysCompliant trades. Similar comparisons are evident for bonds whose issuers were noncompliant with their continuing disclosure obligations ex-ante. The average NeverCompliant purchase size is three times as large and the markup is 15 bps higher than the average NewlyCompliant purchase. 4 Relationship between the small trade premium (discount) and disclosure 4.1 Cross-sectional variation in the small trade premium (discount)
Panel C of
Small investors pay more for the same bond than large investors. Thus, the remainder of the paper focuses on variation in trade markups and markdowns at the bond level. I term the difference between the average markup on small retail trades and the average markup on large institutional trades in the same bond the "small trade premium." Similarly, the difference between the average markdown on small retail trades and the average markdown on large institutional trades in the same bond is the "small trade discount."
Though several prior papers document relationships between bond characteristics and the average level of trade markups, variation in the small trade premium (discount) has not been documented. Panel A of Table   3 documents patterns in the average small trade premium on customer purchases while Panel B documents patterns in the average small trade discount on customer sales. The small trade discount on sales is larger than the small trade premium on purchases, suggesting retail buyers have more relative bargaining power than retail sellers. Many retail sales are estate settlements in which incentives to perform due diligence and negotiate favorable pricing are lower than when an individual is approached by a dealer to purchase a bond.
I consider five characteristics that are likely to impede retail investors' ability to price bonds. The small trade premium (and discount) exhibits predictable patterns across each of these five characteristics that are consistent with cross-sectional variation in the extent to which small retail investors are disadvantaged in pricing bonds. Moreover, disclosure compliance tends to be present together with lower small trade premiums (discounts). First, small retail investors pay a 16.96 bp larger premium (11.88 bp discount) for bonds that are not rated by both Moody's and Standard & Poor's than they pay for bonds that are rated by both agencies. Investors have fewer sources of information related to these bonds, which is further exacerbated by the statistically lower disclosure compliance of issuers of unrated bonds. Second, the small trade premium is 21.04 (and the discount is 16.64) bps larger for callable bonds than non-callable bonds, consistent with small retail investors having difficulty pricing complex bonds (Harris and Piwowar, 2006) . Moreover, issuers of callable bonds provide less disclosure than issuers of non-callable bonds.
Third, the small trade discount is 13.09 bps higher for pre-refunded bonds than those that are not pre-refunded. This is counterintuitive because the funds that will ultimately repay holders of these bonds are held in escrow. However, perhaps the fact that continuing disclosures are not required after a bond is refunded exacerbates information asymmetry between large investors with the sophistication to benchmark against similar bonds and less knowledgeable small investors. Fourth, the small trade premium is 6.02 (and the discount is 10.16) bps smaller for bonds issued by states, cities, and counties than other issuers. This disparity is perhaps due to low-cost access to the relatively greater quantity of economic and fundamental information about these issuers. Finally, small retail investors pay an additional 3.98 bp premium (7.63 bp discount) relative to large institutional investors for revenue bonds than non-revenue bonds. Disclosure is statistically lower for these bonds despite the fact that the specificity of the revenue source that repays these bonds makes issuer disclosure particularly important.
Disclosure, dissemination, and changes in the small trade premium (discount)
To identify the relation between disclosure and the small trade premium (discount), I measure changes in markups (markdowns) on small retail trades and large institutional trades around the introduction of EMMA. Because no temporal variation exists in the inception of the public disclosure repository, controlling for unrelated changes in markups (markdowns) to ensure the effects are attributable to disclosure is important. My empirical strategy addresses this issue in several ways. First, I employ a difference-in-difference design, benchmarking small retail trade markups (markdowns) against large institutional trade markups (markdowns) in the periods before and after EMMA. This design uses large institutional traders, who had relatively low-cost access to available financial disclosures before the dissemination mechanism changed, as a control group. Moreover, institutional traders have the expertise and resources to benchmark against similar bonds in the absence of disclosure. Any changes in markups (markdowns) that are unrelated to disclosure would need to affect small and large trades differently to influence my results.
Second, I exploit variation in ex-ante disclosure compliance at the bond level. I estimate the benefit of dissemination by measuring the change in the small trade premium (discount) for AlwaysCompliant bonds.
To ensure the result is not driven by an unrelated market shift, I perform a falsification test that estimates the change in the small trade premium (discount) for NewlyNonCompliant bonds. These issuers' disclosures were not disseminated and therefore retail investors trading these bonds should not benefit from dissemination.
Similarly, I estimate the benefit of improved disclosure by measuring the change in the premium (discount)
for NewlyCompliant bonds. The falsification test measures the change in small trade premium (discount) for NeverCompliant bonds. Investors in NeverCompliant bonds do not benefit from improved disclosure or dissemination.
Finally, I perform cross-sectional analyses. After estimating the relationship between dissemination and the small trade premium (discount) for the entire sample of AlwaysCompliant bonds, I bifurcate the sample into bonds issued by large, general purpose issuers and bonds issued by less well-known issuers. Dissemination of information is not likely an impediment for investors in bonds issued by large general purpose issuers (such as states, cities, and counties) with web sites. Investors in bonds issued by less well-known issuers are more likely to benefit from dissemination. Similarly, after estimating the relationship between improved disclosure and the small trade premium (discount) for the entire sample of NewlyCompliant bonds, I partition the sample into revenue bonds and non-revenue bonds. Because of the specificity of the source of repayment for these bonds, disclosures made by revenue bond issuers are more likely to provide new information to market participants than disclosures made by issuers of general obligation bonds.
The final cross-sectional analysis acknowledges that all disclosure is not created equal. Specifically, disclosure is less likely to be informative to investors if it is not timely. Therefore, I bifurcate the sample of AlwaysCompliant bonds and NewlyCompliant bonds into those whose issuers are timely disclosers and those whose issuers are non-timely disclosers. I define disclosure as timely if the number of days between the period-end date (if available) and the filing date of the first filing in EMMA is less than or equal to 180 days. After six months, information provided in the filing is likely too stale to be useful.
Univariate comparisons of transaction costs on small and large trades
The focus of this study is on changes in the difference between small trade transaction costs and large trade transaction costs, which I attribute to changes in the relative bargaining power of these investors. Changes in transaction costs that are not attributable to bargaining power are controlled through the benchmark sample of large institutional trades. Changes in transaction costs for the benchmark sample of large institutional trades are worthy of discussion because the period I study is characterized by falling interest rates and falling credit risk.
10 In that interest rates (Green et al., 2007b) and credit risk (Harris and Piwowar, 2006) are positively correlated with municipal transaction costs, falling transaction costs are to be expected.
Panel A of Table 4 demonstrates that markups on large institutional trades of AlwaysCompliant bonds (which are, on average, rated A+) fell just 3.07 basis points over the sample period. By contrast, the average markup on large institutional trades of NeverCompliant bonds (which are, on average, rated just above BBB+) fell 21.72 basis points over the sample period. NeverCompliant bonds are higher risk, and thus have the most dramatic drop in transaction costs. This drop is, however, statistically the same for large and small trades because information asymmetry between these two types of traders is unchanged. These univariate observations demonstrate the importance of using large institutional transaction costs as a benchmark and controlling for trends, economic changes, and the interest rate environment.
Univariate comparisons of average markups (markdowns) on small retail trades to those on large institutional trades in the periods before and after EMMA was implemented illustrate that the AlwaysCompliant small trade premium is statistically and economically lower after EMMA than before EMMA. Whereas large institutional trade markups on AlwaysCompliant bonds are only 3.07 bps smaller after EMMA than before EMMA, the average markup on small retail trades of AlwaysCompliant bonds is 18.05 bp smaller after EMMA than before EMMA. Thus, the AlwaysCompliant small trade premium was reduced by 14.98 bps.
By contrast, the difference between the pre-EMMA small trade premium and the post-EMMA small trade premium in the falsification sample of NewlyNonCompliant bonds is not statistically different from zero. Because of the disparity in sample size and the lack of covariate balance between AlwaysCompliant bonds and NewlyNonCompliant bonds, it is not appropriate to perform a difference-in-difference-in-difference between these two samples. Nonetheless, the 9.44 bp greater reduction of the small trade premium for
AlwaysCompliant bonds is statistically significant and consistent with a convergence in bargaining power that is attributable to dissemination.
Similarly, the NewlyCompliant small trade premium is 13.36 bps smaller after EMMA than before EMMA.
This statistically significant reduction is consistent with a convergence in bargaining power attributable to improved disclosure that is not evident in the falsification sample of NeverCompliant bonds. Though the 8.87
bp greater reduction of the small trade premium for NewlyCompliant bonds is consistent with a convergence in bargaining power that is attributable to improved disclosure, the difference is not statistically significant due to the small sample of NeverCompliant bonds.
Panel B of Table 4 shows that retail and institutional markdowns on sales did not converge in a statistically powerful way for any group of bonds after EMMA. AlwaysCompliant bonds experience a 0.60 bp increase in the small trade discount and NewlyCompliant bonds experience a 7.22 bp decrease after EMMA. Neither of these differences is statistically significant.
Multivariable regressions
Unlike the univariate statistics that aggregate trades by bond and broad timeframe, I estimate the following regression at the transaction level:
where α is a bond fixed effect Time-invariant bond characteristics do not need to be controlled because the bond fixed effect absorbs them. It is, however, important to control for variation in bond and market characteristics. I control for interest rate changes with the daily level of the 10-Year treasury (Green et al., 2007b) , changes in municipal market conditions with the daily level of the AAA General Obligation yield curve, and economic changes with contemporaneous gross state product (Harris and Piwowar, 2006) . I control for changes in credit risk premia with the yield differential between Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield and Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond yield. I control for the log of trade size to account for the possibility that trade sizes within categories changed after EMMA. Costs of intermediation at the transaction level are controlled through the logged par value of all transactions in bond b on date t. I also include an indicator equal to one in the purchase regressions if a preceding customer sale is not observed on date t or t-1 and equal to one in the sale regressions if a subsequent customer purchase is not observed on date t or t+1 (Sirri, 2014) . Finally, I
control for the age of the bond and the time remaining to maturity (Harris and Piwowar, 2006) .
Because the dependent variable is the markup (markdown) on an individual transaction, more weight is given to bonds that trade frequently than bonds that trade infrequently (as distinct from the univariate statistics which equal-weighted bonds). To adjust for serial correlation within bonds, robust standard errors are clustered at the bond level.
Dissemination and the small trade premium (discount)
Panel A of Though I primarily focus on comparing small retail trades to large institutional trades, results are similar when estimating the change in the premium paid by large retail investors and small institutional investors.
Specifically, relative to the change in large institutional markups, the premium associated with large retail trades of AlwaysCompliant bonds fell 8.94 bps (or 25 percent) and the premium associated with small institutional trades fell 5.32 bps (or 25 percent).
The coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with expectations. Markups increase with municipal and treasury yields and credit risk premia. Larger trade sizes within trade size categories are significantly negatively related to trade markups. Consistent with dealer intermediation increasing transaction costs (Schultz, 2012) , markups are larger when trading volume is higher. Markups are also significantly lower for bonds that remain in inventory for more than a day, perhaps because dealers eager to get a bond out of inventory are willing to sell for less (Sirri, 2014) .
Column 2 presents results for the falsification sample of NewlyNonCompliant bonds. In contrast with the significantly negative coefficient on SmRet*Post in column 1, column 2 demonstrates a marginally significant increase in the small trade premium for NewlyNonCompliant bonds. Because the AlwaysCompliant small trade premium reduction is not evident for NewlyNonCompliant bonds, the reduction can likely be attributed to dissemination.
To gain further assurance that the results are attributable to dissemination, I bifurcate the AlwaysCompliant sample into bonds that are not issued by large general purpose issuers (in column 3) and bonds that are issued by sates, cities, or counties (in column 4). The small trade premium associated with AlwaysCompliant bonds not issued by states, cities, or counties fell 22.22 bps, representing a 49 percent decline relative to the 45.80 bp pre-EMMA small trade premium. Thus, EMMA presented a dramatic change in the information sets of retail investors trading bonds issued by less well-known issuers that are unlikely to maintain web sites.
11 The summation of the 6.52 coefficient on Post and the -12.75 coefficient on SmRet*Post.
By contrast, the small trade premium associated with AlwaysCompliant bonds issued by states, cities, or counties did not change in a statistically or economically meaningful way. This suggests that dissemination through EMMA did not represent a meaningful change in the information sets of retail investors for large issuers that likely maintain web sites to disseminate information.
Columns 5 and 6 demonstrate that the reduction in the AlwaysCompliant small trade premium is only apparent for bonds whose issuers' first disclosure in EMMA was filed within 180 days of period end. The
AlwaysCompliant small trade premium fell 28.20 bps (or 57 percent) for these bonds. By contrast, the convergence of retail and institutional trade markups is not evident for AlwaysCompliant bonds whose issuers' first disclosure in EMMA was not timely. This evidence suggests that disclosure is only informative to retail investors if it is timely. Moreover, these results provide further support for the notion that small trade markups converge toward large trade markups because the information sets of these investors converge.
In contrast with the aforementioned results related to customer purchases, the evidence presented in Panel B does not support the role of access to financial information in reducing small trade discounts on sales.
Although small retail trade markdowns on AlwaysCompliant bonds converge toward markdowns on large institutional trades after EMMA by 15.96 bps (or 28 percent) in column 1, they also converge in column 2. The NewlyNonCompliant small trade discount decreased an economically and statistically significant 25.80 bps (or 37 percent). Because the small trade discount decreased both for bonds whose investors benefited from dissemination and bonds whose investors did not, the convergence cannot be attributed to dissemination, per se. Thus, it does not appear that retail sellers use the information contained in financial disclosures when negotiating with dealers.
Taken together, these results suggest that the cost to access information did not contribute to the relative disadvantage of retail bond sellers but it did contribute to the disadvantage of retail bond buyers.
Improved disclosure compliance and the small trade premium (discount) Table 6 provides evidence supporting the relationship between improved disclosure compliance and the small trade premium for bond purchases, but not the discount on bond sales. Column 1 of panel A demonstrates a significant 20.75 bp convergence in small retail markups toward large institutional markups for NewlyCompliant bonds. This 44 percent reduction in the small trade premium is consistent with the notion that disclosure of issuer-specific fundamental information reduces information asymmetry between retail and institutional investors. Because the reduction in the NewlyCompliant small trade premium is not evident for NeverCompliant bonds, this reduction can likely be attributed to disclosure.
Columns 3 and 4 provide further assurance that the results are attributable to disclosure. Specifically, the reduction in the NewlyCompliant small trade premium is limited to revenue bonds, for which financial disclosure is more useful and more likely to change the information sets of investors. NewlyCompliant revenue bonds experience a 24.82 bp, or 49 percent, reduction in the small trade premium. Moreover, the reduced small trade premium for NewlyCompliant bonds is only significant for bonds whose issuers' first disclosure in EMMA was filed within 180 days of period end. Column 5 documents a significant 29.26 bp, or 42 percent, reduction in the NewlyCompliant small trade premium for bonds whose issuers were timely.
The evidence presented in Panel B does not support the role of improved disclosure compliance in reducing small trade discounts on sales. Column 1 demonstrates a statistically and economically significant 26.40 bp reduction in the small trade discount on NewlyCompliant bonds that is not evident for NeverCompliant bonds in Column 6. While this evidence is consistent with improved disclosure compliance reducing the small trade discount, the cross-sectional evidence casts some doubt that the reduction is attributable to disclosure, per se. The NewlyCompliant small trade discount fell for both revenue bonds as well as nonrevenue bonds even though disclosure should be more important for revenue bonds. In addition, the reduction in the NewlyCompliant discount is not statistically significant for timely or non-timely disclosers.
Together, these results suggest that the existence of fundamental information helps to level the informational playing field between retail and institutional bond buyers but not bond sellers.
Conclusion
Small investors pay more than large investors for municipal bonds in part because opacity and costly information endow institutional investors with bargaining power. In this paper, I estimate the extent to which fundamental information and access thereto can influence the premium small investors pay relative to large investors.
Over the sample period studied, disclosure presents a more dramatic change to the information set of retail investors than institutional investors. Therefore, I focus on the relative cost savings from disclosure rather than aggregate cost savings. Specifically, I examine changes in per-bond transaction costs on small trades relative to large trades around the introduction of a free, centralized repository for municipal disclosure (EMMA). Despite the lack of timeliness and standardization of municipal disclosure, the results suggest that the EMMA repository fulfilled its desired role of informing retail bond buyers. 12 An estimated 60 percent of issuers were compliant with their continuing disclosure requirements in 2009 (Schmitt, 2011) . The average daily par amount purchased in retail-sized transactions in 2009 was $571.8 million (MSRB, 2011) . Assuming bond trading is even across issuers, the 12.5 bp convergence of small retail markups toward large institutional markups equates to $286k per day.
13 An estimated 40 percent of issuers were non-compliant with their continuing disclosure requirements in 2009. The 20.8 bp convergence of small retail markups toward large institutional markups equates to $476k per day.
Appendix: Definitions of variables
Variable Definition >1 day in inventory An indicator equal to one if a customer purchase (sale) does not succeed (precede) a customer sale (purchase) within one day of trade date t.
AAA GO yield
The daily yield on the Bond Buyer General Obligation 20-bond municipal bond index.
Age
Years between the issue date of the bond and the date of the observation, rounded.
AlwaysCompliant
A bond for which all required disclosures from the year after issuance were provided to DPC Data through 2007 and to EMMA through 2011.
Callable
An indicator equal to one if the issuer has the option to redeem the bond before its scheduled maturity date. CompliantAfter A bond for which at least one financial filing was submitted to EMMA in each of its first two years of existence.
CompliantBefore
A bond for which all required disclosures from the year after issuance through 2007 were provided to DPC Data.
Credit rating
The average credit rating across rating agencies at issuance. A credit rating of "Aaa" is coded as "24," decreasing to a rating of "D," coded as "1." Non-rated issues are coded as "0" in the regressions.
Debt outstanding
The par value of all bonds outstanding from the issuer as of December 31, 2015.
EMMA
The Electronic Municipal Market Access system, operated by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. This web-based system makes offering documents, issuer financial statements, secondary trade data, event notices, and credit ratings available to the public free of charge.
References to "EMMA" in this paper relate to the continuing disclosure service enacted on July 1, 2009.
Gross State Product (GSP)
Annual level of GSP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Insured
An indicator equal to one if the principal and interest payments are guaranteed by a municipal bond insurer.
Issue size
The aggregate par value of all bonds in bond b's issuance.
Large general purpose (LgGP)
An indicator equal to one if the bond is issued by a state, city, or county. Information about these issuers is relatively easy to access online.
Large institutional (LgInst)
Trades with par values equal to or greater than $250,000.
Large retail (LgRet)
Trades with par values greater than or equal to $25,000 but less than $100,000.
Markdown
The basis point difference between the average price at which dealers transact with one another and the price at which customers sell the same bond on the same day.
Markup
The basis point difference between the average price at which dealers transact with one another and the price at which customers purchase the same bond on the same day.
Municipal bond
A certificate of debt issued by a state or local government or its agencies. NewlyCompliant A bond for which at least one required post-issuance disclosure was not provided to DPC Data before 2007, however at least one financial filing was submitted to EMMA in each of its first two years of existence.
NewlyNonCompliant
A bond for which all required post-issuance disclosure was provided to DPC Data before 2007, however disclosure was not provided in at least one of the first two years of EMMA's existence.
Number of dealers
The number of inter-dealer transactions reported in bond b on date t. Pre-refunded A bond issue that is redeemed before the first call date (usually to obtain a lower interest rate). The funds to repay bondholders are held in escrow until the refunded bonds become callable. Refunding status is measured as of December 31, 2011.
Appendix, continued Variable Definition Revenue bond
An indicator equal to one if bond b is classified as a revenue bond, supported by a specific source of revenue rather than the taxing authority of the issuer.
Risk Premium
The yield difference between Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield and Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond yield. Obtained on a monthly basis from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Small institutional (SmInst)
Trades with par values greater than or equal to $100,000 and less than $250,000.
Small retail (SmRet)
Trades with par values less than $25,000.
Small trade discount
The difference between the markdown charged on small retail sales and the markdown charged on large institutional sales in the same bond. Small retail transactions are those less than $25,000 in par value and large institutional transactions are those greater than or equal to $250,000 in par value.
Small trade premium
The difference between the markup charged on small retail purchases and the markup charged on large institutional purchases in the same bond. Small retail transactions are those less than $25,000 in par value and large institutional transactions are those greater than or equal to $250,000 in par value.
Time to maturity
Years between the date of the observation and the maturity date of the bond, rounded.
Timely
An indicator equal to one if the number of days between the period-end date (if available) and the filing date of the first filing in EMMA is less than or equal to 180.
Trade size
The par value traded, as reported by the MSRB.
Treasury
The daily yield on the 10-year treasury bond. Unrated A bond that is not rated by both Moody's and Standard & Poors at issuance.
Volume
The aggregate par value of all transactions (inter-dealer, customer sales, and customer purchases) in bond b on date t. Table 2 : Statistics describing bonds, bond purchases, and bond sales Panel A summarizes the characteristics of the 3,741 bonds in the sample. Panel B summarizes transaction characteristics of 538,444 purchases of 3,139 bonds. Panel C summarizes transaction characteristics of 177,772 sales of 1,841 bonds. Column (a) presents sample means for AlwaysCompliant bonds and column (b) presents means for NewlyNonCompliant bonds. Issuers of AlwaysCompliant bonds were compliant with their continuing disclosure obligations to DPC Data from the year after issuance through 2007 and were also compliant in EMMA in each of its first two years of existence. NewlyNonCompliant bonds were compliant with DPC Data but non-compliant in EMMA. Column (c) presents sample means for NewlyCompliant bonds and column (d) presents means for NeverCompliant bonds. Issuers of NewlyCompliant bonds were non-compliant with their continuing disclosure obligations to DPC Data in at least one year between the year after issuance and 2007, but were compliant in EMMA in each of its first two years of existence. NeverCompliant bonds were non-compliant with DPC Data and non-compliant in EMMA. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Significance levels from two-sided t-tests of mean differences are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 3 : Cross-sectional variation in the small trade premium (discount) and compliance with continuing disclosure obligations
Panel A summarizes the small trade premium and compliance with continuing disclosure obligations for the 3,139 bonds included in the sample of bond purchases. Panel B summarizes the small trade discount and compliance with continuing disclosure obligations for the 1,841 bonds included in the sample of bond sales. The small trade premium (discount) is calculated as the average markup (markdown) on small retail trades minus the average markup (markdown) on large institutional trades in the same bond. Markup (markdown) is the basis point difference between the price paid (received) by a customer and the average price at which dealers transact with one another in bond b on date t, Winsorized at the 1% level. Small retail trades are those with par values less than $25,000 and large institutional trades are those with par values greater than or equal to $250,000. Column (a) presents the mean small trade premium (discount) for sample bonds that possess the characteristic listed in rows 1-5. Column (b) presents the mean small trade premium (discount) for sample bonds that do not possess the listed characteristic. Column (c) presents the proportion of sample bonds possessing the characteristic listed in rows 1-5 that were AlwaysCompliant. Column (d) presents the proportion of bonds that do not possess the characteristic that were AlwaysCompliant. Issuers of AlwaysCompliant bonds were compliant with their continuing disclosure obligations with DPC Data from the year after issuance through 2007 and were also compliant in EMMA in each of its first two years of existence. Unrated bonds are not rated by both Moody's and Standard & Poors. Issuers have the option to redeem Callable bonds before their scheduled maturity date. Pre-refunded bonds are redeemed before the first call date and the funds to repay bondholders are held in escrow until the bonds become callable. Refunding status is measured as of the end of the sample period, December 31, 2011. Large general purpose bonds are issued by states, cities, or counties. Revenue bonds are supported by revenue from a specific source rather than ad valorem taxes. Significance levels from two-sided t-tests of mean differences are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (discount) is calculated as the difference between the average markup (markdown) on small retail trades and the average markup (markdown) on large institutional trades in the same bond. Markup is the implied dealer markup (in basis points) charged on a customer purchase relative to the average price at which dealers transact with one another in bond b on date t, Winsorized at the 1% level. Markdown is the implied dealer markdown charged on a customer sale. Small retail trades (SmRet) are those with par values less than $25,000 and large institutional trades (LgInst) are those with par values greater than or equal to $250,000. Significance levels from two-sided t-tests of mean differences are presented. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Small trade premiums on purchases of bonds based on their disclosure compliance before and after EMMA Small retail trades (SmRet) are those with par values less than $25,000 and large retail trades (LgRet) are those with par values greater than or equal to $25,000 but less than $100,000. Small institutional trades (SmInst) are those with par values greater than or equal to $100,000 but less than $250,000 and large institutional trades (LgInst) are those with par values greater than or equal to $250,000. EMMA was established as the sole continuing disclosure on July 1, 2009, lowering the cost for retail investors to access financial disclosures. Issuers of AlwaysCompliant bonds were compliant with their continuing disclosure obligations to DPC Data from the year after issuance through 2007 and were also compliant in EMMA in each of its first two years of existence. NewlyNonCompliant bonds were compliant with DPC Data but non-compliant in EMMA. The variable of interest is SmRet*Post, which measures the change in the additional markup (markdown) small retail investors pay above large institutional investors after EMMA is implemented. All columns include bond fixed effects, year fixed effects, a linear time trend variable, and group-specific linear time trends for small retail, large retail, and small institutional trades. Column 1 includes AlwaysCompliant bonds. Column 2 presents the results of a falsification test of bonds for whom transaction costs are unaffected by dissemination, NewlyNonCompliant bonds. Columns 4 and 6 present results for bonds that are less affected by disclosure than the bonds in columns 3 and 5. Column 3 includes AlwaysCompliant bonds not issued by large, general purpose issuers (Non-LgGP ) and column 4 includes AlwaysCompliant bonds issued by states, cities, or counties (LgGP ). Column 5 includes AlwaysCompliant bonds whose issuers' first disclosure in EMMA was filed within 180 days of period-end (Timely) and column 6 includes AlwaysCompliant bonds whose issuers' first disclosure was filed more than 180 days after period-end (NotTimely). The average pre-EMMA premium (discount) before adding controls is provided for each size category for comparison purposes. Control variables are defined in the Appendix. If applicable, the predicted sign of the coefficient (Pred.) is provided. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bond level. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The adjusted R-squared (within) describes the extent to which the regression explains variation in markups and markdowns within bonds. The adjusted R-squared (overall) describes the extent to which cross-sectional variation in the dependent variable (markup / markdown) is explained. Small retail trades (SmRet) are those with par values less than $25,000 and large retail trades (LgRet) are those with par values greater than or equal to $25,000 but less than $100,000. Small institutional trades (SmInst) are those with par values greater than or equal to $100,000 but less than $250,000 and large institutional trades (LgInst) are those with par values greater than or equal to $250,000. EMMA was established as the sole continuing disclosure on July 1, 2009, lowering the cost for retail investors to access financial disclosures. Issuers of NewlyCompliant bonds were non-compliant with their continuing disclosure obligations to DPC Data in at least one year between the year after issuance and 2007, but were compliant in EMMA in each of its first two years of existence. NeverCompliant bonds were non-compliant with DPC Data and non-compliant in EMMA.
The variable of interest is SmRet*Post, which measures the change in the additional markup (markdown) small retail investors pay above large institutional investors after EMMA is implemented. All columns include bond fixed effects, year fixed effects, a linear time trend variable, and group-specific linear time trends for small retail, large retail, and small institutional trades. Column 1 includes bonds that are NewlyCompliant. Column 2 presents the results of a falsification test of bonds for whom transaction costs are unaffected by disclosure, NeverCompliant bonds. Columns 4 and 6 present results for bonds that are less affected by disclosure than the bonds in columns 3 and 5. Column 3 includes NewlyCompliant bonds that are revenue bonds (Rev ) and column 4 includes bonds that are NewlyCompliant but are not revenue bonds (Non-Rev ). Column 5 includes NewlyCompliant bonds whose issuers' first disclosure in EMMA was filed within 180 days of period-end (Timely) and column 6 includes NewlyCompliant bonds whose issuers' first disclosure was filed more than 180 days after period-end (NotTimely). The average pre-EMMA premium (discount) before adding controls is provided for each size category for comparison purposes. Control variables are defined in the Appendix. If applicable, the predicted sign of the coefficient (Pred.) is provided. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bond level. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The adjusted R-squared (within) describes the extent to which the regression explains variation in markups and markdowns within bonds. The adjusted R-squared (overall) describes the extent to which cross-sectional variation in the dependent variable (markup / markdown) is explained. 
